EU to Modify Anti-dumping
Rules to Allow Artificial Price for All Cases of “Distortive” Pricing for China
and Other Countries
The EU’s executive arm released on Wednesday
its highly-anticipated proposal for revising its anti-dumping and anti-subsidy
rules, setting the stage for an upcoming discussion with lawmakers and the
Council in a bid to reach an agreed outcome swiftly.
The EU trade chief particularly referred to the issue of
overcapacity in the steel sector, citing China as a prime example. China is by
far the world’s largest producer of steel, massively outpacing other
steel-exporting countries.
Beijing has argued that the issue of overcapacity and falling
steel prices is a problem that is global in nature, and leaders of major
exporting economies have agreed in other forums that it will thus require a
global solution.
A related factsheet from the European Commission similarly
suggests that overcapacity, along with other changes in the international trade
landscape over the last several years, makes it absolutely paramount for the
bloc to have the most updated toolkit available for dealing with allegedly
unfair trading practices.
Tackling
distortions
As
previously announced in July, the proposal would take the bloc away from using
lists of “non-market economies” and “market economies” when conducting its
trade remedy investigations.
Currently, EU investigative authorities separate countries
into lists depending on whether they meet a set of “market economy” criteria.
Should they be classified as a non-market economy, then the authorities use
what is known as an “analogue” method, where they determine a good’s “normal
value” by using a “price or constructed value” from a market economy country.
The proposed new system would instead focus on cases where
“distortions” arise in domestic prices or costs, such as when government
intervention is involved.
The EU’s executive arm then lists a series of factors that
would play into this assessment. These include, for instance, whether the
relevant market is largely made up of state-owned or controlled businesses;
situations where the state is in a position to “interfere with respect to
prices or costs”; and policies that give domestic producers an unfair advantage
relative to their foreign counterparts.
Under this “distortions” scenario,” the EU Commission is
proposing that the normal value then be developed “on the basis of costs of
production and sale reflecting undistorted prices and benchmarks,” such as by
using data from another “appropriate representative country with a similar
level of economic development as the exporting country.”
The proposal would also have the EU’s executive arm release
public reports on market conditions in different countries and sectors, in
order to then determine whether these “distortions” are affecting prices and
costs to the extent that they would not be suitable benchmarks for determining
normal value.
“The proposal we are now putting forward moves the EU closer
to the trade defence systems of other major trading partners around the world,
including the United States,” said Malmström on
Wednesday.
Existing
investigations, subsidy rules
The
proposal would have existing trade remedy probes be governed under current EU
anti-dumping rules, rather than using the proposed new system. As for trade
remedy measures already in place, these would also continue under the old rules
unless there was a clear reason to revisit them, such as when “factual
circumstances” of exporters change.
The document also confirms earlier plans to revise
anti-subsidy rules, specifically to address cases where the actual extent of
unfair state aid to exporters is only identified once an investigation is
already underway.
Should this occur, the Commission is suggesting having
“consultations” with the relevant country involved, with the subsidy
information to factor into determining final duties.
December
deadline
The
push to revise the EU’s anti-dumping rules comes ahead of a December 2016
deadline included in China’s terms for joining the World Trade Organization.
Under the original terms, importing WTO members have two ways
of calculating duties in trade remedy investigations involving Chinese
producers/exporters – one involving domestic prices in the Asian economy, the
other allowing for countries to “deviate” from using such prices.
Which of these options applies depends on whether Chinese
producers can prove that market conditions exist in their industry. However,
the WTO “accession” terms also include a clause that foresees terminating the
option of using surrogate prices within 15 years of China becoming a member of
the Geneva-based organisation, though how to read this relative to the rest of
the accession terms has been the subject of debate in trade circles.