Fed
Says It Failed to Act on Problems That Led to Silicon Valley Bank Collapse
Top bank
regulator calls for revamping a range of rules for midsize banks
The Federal Reserve’s
banking supervisors failed to take forceful action to address growing problems
at Silicon Valley Bank before it collapsed last month, the central bank’s top
regulator said, signaling a broad push to toughen
rules on the industry.
Michael Barr, the Fed’s vice
chair for supervision, said supervisors didn’t fully appreciate the extent of the
vulnerabilities as SVB grew in size and complexity. When supervisors did find
risks, they didn’t take sufficient steps to ensure the firm fixed those
problems quickly enough, he said in a report Friday.
Regulators took control of
Santa Clara, Calif.-based SVB on March 10. The collapse sparked a panic that
led to the failure of New York-based Signature Bank and an intervention by
financial regulators to protect uninsured depositors at both banks. The Fed
supervised SVB and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. supervised
Signature.
The chaos has since quieted,
but some banks still face concerns. San Francisco-based First Republic Bank
faces significant challenges, and there are no easy options for stemming the
crisis at the bank.
The FDIC issued a separate report
Friday analyzing its oversight of Signature, which
failed two days after SVB. The FDIC said that it was slow to escalate issues
that it had identified with the bank’s management. It put much of the blame on
Signature, which it said grew too fast and wasn’t responsive enough when the
FDIC raised concerns.
Yet another report on Friday
from the Government Accountability Office, a congressional watchdog, said
regulators identified problems at both banks in recent years but didn’t
escalate supervisory actions in time to prevent their failures.
Mr. Barr on Friday called
for revamping a range of rules that apply to banks with more than $100 billion
in assets, and he called for re-evaluating how regulators treat deposits above
a $250,000 federal insurance limit. Both banks had a large amount of such
deposits, which fled quickly as trouble mounted.
In a statement accompanying
the Fed’s report, Fed Chair Jerome Powell said he would back steps outlined by
Mr. Barr to toughen industry oversight over the coming years. That would
essentially reverse some moves made earlier in Mr. Powell’s tenure to ease the
rules for midsize banks. The Fed chair said such changes would lead to “a
stronger and more resilient banking system.”
Some congressional
Republicans criticized the report’s calls for more regulation. Rep. Patrick
McHenry (R., N.C.), chairman of the House Financial Services Committee,
characterized it as a “self-serving…justification of Democrats’ long-held
priorities.”
Of Mr. Barr’s four top
takeaways about the events leading to SVB’s collapse, three are tied to
perceived shortcomings with the Fed’s banking oversight. The report focuses on
errors by the agency but not on individuals’ responsibility.
Mr. Barr said mistakes by
Fed regulators were driven in part by the Trump-era changes that generally
eased rules on midsize banks. He also said a shift in the agency’s culture
appears to have resulted in a lighter-touch form of supervision.
Those changes “impeded
effective supervision by reducing standards, increasing complexity, and
promoting a less assertive supervisory approach,” he said.
Mr. Barr’s predecessor as
vice chair for supervision, Randal Quarles, disputed that finding. He said the
report “provides no evidence at all for what it describes as one of its main conclusions—that
a ‘shift in the stance of supervisory policy’ impeded effective supervision of
the bank.”
The Fed also pinned some
blame on its own bureaucratic structure. Authority for overseeing banks is parceled out to the Fed’s regional bank branches, but in
practice, the central hub in Washington provides extensive input and must
approve some enforcement actions.
The Fed said that while
supervisors had identified issues around interest-rate risk that contributed to
SVB’s failure, the process was “too deliberative” and focused on building
evidence before it took action. The firm failed before the Fed completed a
planned downgrade of one of its key regulatory ratings of the bank.
Two staffers briefed the
Fed’s Board of Governors on Feb. 14 about the risks of unrealized losses banks
faced from falling securities prices, according to the Fed. The 11-slide
presentation, delivered by a Fed staffer from the D.C.-based board and an
employee of the Kansas City Fed, drew attention to one institution
SVB.
SVB had 31 open supervisory
findings, or warnings from regulators, when it failed, which was three times
the number at peer firms, the Fed said. They spanned everything from liquidity
to technology.
In August, the San Francisco
Fed gave the bank a failing rating for its governance and control practices. As
the firm grew rapidly in 2021, it “did not maintain a risk management function
commensurate with the growing size and complexity of the firm,” examiners said
in a letter to the bank. The firm’s risk management wasn’t effective, the San
Francisco Fed warned.
That month, regulators said
“interest rate hedges implemented in 2021 have effectively mitigated the bank’s
exposure to rising interest rates.” A few months earlier, SVB had removed some
of its hedges against rising rates. It was effectively preparing its balance
sheet for rates to fall, rather than to continue rising, which is what
ultimately happened.
The Fed overlooked broader
problems in recent years as the bank grew. For a long time, it used metrics for
liquidity that suggested SVB had a stable deposit base and rated the bank’s
interest-rate risk as satisfactory despite the firm breaching internal risk
limits over a number of years.
The report also pinned blame
on the bank’s poor oversight of itself, saying “the board put short-run profits
above effective risk management and often treated resolution of supervisory
issues as a compliance exercise rather than a critical risk-management issue.”
Through last year, the bank paid management based on earnings and stock
returns, and didn’t focus on risk management.
The Fed’s report describes
risk-management failures that built up over a period of years, but they showed
up acutely in the bank’s final days. For example, SVB had not tested its
capacity to borrow at the Fed’s emergency lending facility last year, making a
last-minute scramble for funding impossible. Having those safeguards in place
might have made the bank’s resolution more orderly, the Fed said.
Problems at Signature Bank
had been flagged by the FDIC, but the regulator said in its own report that it
could have gone farther. It downgraded its rating of the bank’s liquidity risk
management in 2019, signaling that it needed to
improve, but said it should have also downgraded its rating of management
because its faulty oversight persisted. The bank had high concentrations of
uninsured deposits, with some 60 clients holding balances of more than $250
million, making up about 40 percent of total deposits, the agency said.
Signature’s deposits more
than doubled between the end of 2019 and the end of 2021, tracking the growth
of the cryptocurrency industry, which made up a chunk of its customer base. A buildup of cash on its balance sheet masked continued
problems with liquidity risk management. Then, a downdraft in crypto in 2022
depleted the cash, the FDIC said.
The FDIC also said that
staffing shortages hampered its ability to communicate issues to Signature in a
timely manner. Since the pandemic started, the supervisory group overseeing
large financial institutions in its New York office has had average vacancies
of 40 percent, the agency said. For the last six years, it couldn’t adequately
staff the team dedicated to Signature.
Another round of
congressional hearings with top bank regulators is planned for mid-May. The
House Oversight Committee has said that it plans to investigate the San
Francisco Fed, which shared jurisdiction of SVB with the Fed board in
Washington. The Fed’s Office of Inspector General has launched its own review.
Another report expected Monday
will assess deposit insurance and may outline options to overhaul the existing
system.