Libor, Long
the Most Important Number in Finance, Dies at 52
Bankers
used it until the end. Regulators say good riddance after its infamous fall.
The
London interbank offered rate, a number that spent decades as a central force
of international finance and was used in setting interest rates on everything
from mortgages to student loans, has died after a long battle with regulators.
It was 52.
Known
as Libor, the interest-rate benchmark once underpinned more than $300 trillion
in financial contracts but was undone after a yearslong
market-rigging scandal came to light in 2008. It turned out that bankers had
been coordinating with one another to manipulate the rate, pronounced
“LIE-bore,” by skewing the number higher or lower for their banks’ gain.
Libor
could no longer be used to calculate new deals as of
Dec. 31 — more than six years after a former UBS trader was jailed for his
efforts to manipulate it and others were fired, charged or acquitted. Global
banks including Barclays, UBS and Royal Bank of Scotland ultimately paid more
than $9 billion in fines for fixing the rate for their own profit.
Randal Quarles, then the
Federal Reserve’s vice chair for supervision, offered a scathing early eulogy
in October, saying Libor “was not what it purported to be.”
“It
claimed to be a measure of the cost of bank funding in the London money
markets, but over time it became more of an arbitrary and sometimes
self-interested announcement of what banks simply wished to charge,” Mr.
Quarles said.
While regulators
and central bankers were relieved by its departure,
Libor will be mourned by many bankers who used it to determine the interest
rates for all kinds of financial products, from various types of mortgages to
bonds.
“There
are not many corners of the financial market that Libor hasn’t touched,” said Sonali Theisen, head of
fixed-income electronic trading and market structure at Bank of America. Even
so, she said, getting rid of it was “a necessary surgical extraction of a vital
organ.”
Libor
was born in 1969 to Minos Zombanakis, a Greek banker.
The shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, wanted an $80 million loan, and Mr. Zombanakis
was willing to provide it. But the question of the
interest rate to charge a sovereign ruler was a tricky one. So
he looked to the rate that other well-heeled borrowers — London’s banks — would
pay to borrow from one another.
In
its early years, Libor was a growing but still adolescent rate, employed for a
steadily increasing number of contracts. In 1986, at age 17, it hit the big
time: Libor was taken in by the British Bankers
Association, a trade group described later by The New York Times as a “club of
gentlemen bankers.”
They
effectively made it the basis for virtually all the business they conducted.
Libor was the interest rate that banks themselves had to pay, so it offered a
convenient base line for the rates they charged customers who wanted to borrow
cash to buy a home or issue a security to finance a business expansion.
Libor became a number punched into almost any calculation involving
financial products, from the humble to the exotic. The British banks used it to
set rates for loans across the industry, whether denominated in dollars,
British pounds, euros or Japanese yen. Never before had there been such a benchmark,
and Libor’s daily movements were the very heartbeat of international finance.
But
as Libor approached middle age, troubling health problems began to emerge.
By 2008, regulators in the United States and Britain began receiving
information that banks’ rate reports were amiss. Because Libor relied on
self-reported estimates, it was possible for a bank to submit a rate that was
artificially high or low, thus making certain financial holdings more
profitable.
Soon, news media reports cast doubt on Libor’s integrity, and
investigators ultimately uncovered blatant misconduct in the rate-setting
process. In one email released by regulators in 2012 as part of an
investigation into Barclays, a trader thanked a banker at another firm for
setting a lower rate by saying: “Dude, I owe you big time! Come over one day
after work and I’m opening a bottle of Bollinger” — a reference to the
Champagne producer.
The scandal grabbed international headlines, from the Financial Times to
The Wall Street Journal to The New York Times. Before long, Libor was the butt
of jokes on “The Daily Show.”
The
banking industry — which for decades built trading
systems around Libor — held on to it, despite the grim prognosis. Many bankers
dragged their feet in making the necessary changes because Libor was so was
widely used in the financial system, prompting exasperated speeches from the
officials charged with taking the rate fully out of commission.
“The deniers and the laggards are engaging in magical thinking,” Mr.
Quarles said in June. “Libor is over.”
Not exactly, though. Libor was still viable until the end of the year,
and some bankers continued to use it to make leveraged loan deals into its
final hours. Those and other existing contracts mean Libor will exist in
something of a zombie state until they, too, come to an end.
Mr. Quarles, perhaps reluctant to speak ill of the dead, said on Tuesday
that Libor’s problems hadn’t necessarily been
insurmountable. “You whack the people that did the manipulation and say, ‘Don’t
do that again,’ and then you move on,” he said. “You don’t need to rebuild the
interstate highway if people are speeding.”
Even so, he said, Libor’s time had passed, “and fortunately the market
has moved on.”
Libor is survived by several successors, each
making a claim to its crown.
The
Secured Overnight Financing Rate, or SOFR — a rate produced by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York that is based on transaction data, not estimates — has already
been embraced by many banks in the United States and has the endorsement of the
Fed. Others, like the American Interbank Offered Rate, or Ameribor,
and the Bloomberg Short-Term Bank Yield Index, or BSBY, have their adherents.
In Britain, the Sterling Overnight Index Average, or SONIA, seeks to inherit
Libor’s place as the do-it-all benchmark.
J. Christopher Giancarlo, a board member of the American Financial
Exchange, which calculates Ameribor, said Libor was
once a “giant.” It was, he said in an interview, the
foundation of a system that gave every player in the financial hierarchy a way
to take a cut.
“The problem with Mr. Libor is, for a time, he had it all,” said Mr. Giancarlo,
a former chairman of the U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission. Libor was once “on top of the world,” he said, but became a
“disreputable, tottering old geezer at the end.”