Nairobi Ministerial of WTO Ends, US has its Way

India Isolated again, Signs on Dotted Line

Arun and Asim Goyal Report Direct from Nairobi

Nairobi, 19 Nov: The Tenth Ministerial Conference (MC10) ended in Nairobi, Kenya, on Saturday 19 Nov at the Kenyatta Conference Centre, refurbished with Rs. 80 crs from US and EU donors. Dancers pirouetted to the beat of African music at the start of the event but few remained by the extended session on Saturday. The mood turned despondent as ministerial achieved little beyond the IT Agreement between the super powers.

Conference Chairman Amina Mohamed and WTO DG Azevêdo "Its done"

Nairobi Ministerial Declaration (NMD) saw a concluded ITA-II between 52 of the 162 members. (The remaining 110 get free rides at zero duty for their exports accounting for only 10% of world IT trade).

New negotiating approach from developing and least developed economies was visible with tacit support to New Issues advocated by Developed world.

The accession of Liberia and Afghanistan and expressions of interest from Somalia and Iran shows the enlargement of the WTO footprint.

“Members must decide – the world must decide – about the future of this organisation,” said WTO Director-General Roberto Azevêdo during the closing moments of the ministerial. (It seems that the Developed Countries and trade super powers see WTO as a means of maintaining rule based trade through dispute settlement. The market openings will be in the realm of RTAs).

“The world must decide what path this organisation must take. Inaction itself is a decision and I believe the price of inaction is too high,” Azevêdo added, noting that the year ahead leaves them with a “very serious task.”

The agreement disciplining agricultural export competition is lauded as “historic”, “an achievement that eluded the trade system for 60 years” since the GATT imposed similar curbs on export subsidies for industrial goods.

“We recognize that many Members reaffirm the Doha Development Agenda, and the Declarations and Decisions adopted at Doha and at the Ministerial Conferences held since then, and reaffirm their full commitment to conclude the DDA on that basis. Other Members do not reaffirm the Doha mandates, as they believe new approaches are necessary to achieve meaningful outcomes in multilateral negotiations. Members have different views on how to address the negotiations,” the declaration reads.

The way ahead could mean revival of the Singapore issues of Investment Competition Policy, Currency, Energy and Tech Trade. The US will go full out on zero for zero deals in other sectors on the lines of the ITA I and ITA II and Government procurement agreements.

The declaration specifically refers to agriculture - domestic support, market access, and export competition - as well as the other two core issues of industrial market access and services as issues where members aim to advance work.

Mike Froman: Time to be honest, we are at the end of the line on Doha

The US has for the first time publicly called for the Doha Round of global trade negotiations to be abandoned, arguing that after almost a decade and a half of fruitless discussions, it was time to try new approaches. This point was recognised upfront in the final Ministerial Declaration.

Writing in the Financial Times ahead of the World Trade Organisation’s biennial ministerial meeting in Nairobi this week, USTR Mike Froman said that 14 years after it was launched the Doha Round “simply has not delivered”.

“It is time for the world to free itself of the strictures of Doha.”

The belief of most people in the global business community is that it died a painful and final death in 2008 amid a stalemate over agriculture between developed and developing nations. The first blow to Doha was in Cancun Ministerial in year 2003 followed by the July 2004 package at Geneva when the so-called Singapore issues like investment and competition policy were dropped. The issues of agriculture subsidies by India almost killed the Bali ministerial meet in 2013. The Trade facilitation agreement which was part of the Doha agenda was concluded in an ‘early harvest’ programme in this meeting.

Frustrated at the lack of progress on the Market Access agenda, the US and others have turned their focus in recent years to new regional negotiations such as the recently concluded Trans­Pacific Partnership, which included the US, Japan and 10 other economies.

WTS Reporters

Japan, EU and Australia tilt to the US position

In the lead up to this week’s gathering, other big advanced economies such the EU and Japan have sided with the US in its push for a new approach to negotiations after the Nairobi meeting and a shift to more focused discussions on specific sectors rather than a monolithic global agreement.

EU Commissioners Cecilia Malmström and Phil Hogan – responsible for trade and agriculture, respectively – joined the fray in a joint public statement, saying that they were “concerned by the deep persisting differences” between governments on the post­Nairobi WTO agenda. While the organisation should “keep working on” the outstanding Doha issues, it should also start to address other issues that are important for today’s global trade, the Commissioners argued.

Amina Tilts against India

On 18 December, the Kenya Minister and Conference Head openly declared at a press conference that India and Africa covering 53 Developing and LDC members differed Agriculture subsidies. She said that it is time to bury artificial groups, self-interest is more important.

China Looms

Doha rules of engagement as outdated, particularly with regard to China. Beijing, US officials argue, now has the biggest farm subsidy program in the world. And yet under Doha it is considered a developing economy and may not cut subsidies in the event of a deal even

Developing Countries

The US stance seemed directly at odds with the position taken by India and numerous other developing countries, many of which have argued that the long running talks need to be concluded before moving on to new issues.

A joint ministerial statement from the African Group, China, Ecuador, India, and Venezuela called for a redoubling of efforts to “proceed towards the full, successful, and multilateral conclusion of the negotiations,” referring to the Doha mandate. (It is ironical that these very countries were vehemently opposed to Doha and wanted the unfinished tasks of the Uruguay Round process to be completed before taking on Doha. Now that the finishing line is changed to the TPP type frame, Doha has changed form from “enemy” to “friend”).

Although not referring specifically to the position taken by Froman, the group highlighted the various benefits they say would come from a successful, “comprehensive” conclusion of the Round with “economically meaningful and balanced outcomes.”

Separate statements from both the least developed country (LDC) and small, vulnerable economies (SVE) trade ministers issued going into the conference also called for a successful conclusion to the Doha Round trade talks.

An achievement of great significance, the ITA-II involves products currently valued at US$1.3 trillion annually and responds to the continued evolution of the global digital economy. For many, this model of Most-Favoured Nation (MFN)-based, represented by the ITA-II may become an increasingly more common alternative to multilateral trade agreements under the WTO. The big players do a deal between themselves while the smaller ones accede to the done deal without negotiating on their concerns. The smallest ones come in as “free riders”, that is they export to the signatories at zero duty but charge duty on imports.

E-commerce

WTO members also extended their moratorium prohibiting customs duties on electronic transmissions until the next ministerial conference in 2017, along with renewing a related work programme. The organisation’s General Council is mandated to report in December 2016 and July 2017 on related issues arising in WTO bodies where the work programme is being implemented.

Regional Trade Agreements

The continued proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) has been another area of both interest and concern for WTO members, with the ministerial declaration including language reaffirming “the need to ensure that [RTAs] remain complementary to, not a substitute for, the multilateral trading system.”

The language draws from a proposal made by Brazil on the subject in the context of the WTO’s rules negotiations. The decision puts in place a more active process to report by the next ministerial due in 2017.

Agriculture: Four New Decisions

The Nairobi package includes new ministerial decisions covering a special safeguard mechanism for developing countries; a decision on export subsidies and other “export competition” elements; a decision on cotton; public stockholding for food security purposes.

The decisions, which are legally binding, represent the “most significant outcome on agriculture” seen in the WTO’s 20-year history, Azevêdo told members.

Special Safeguard Mechanism – Dedicated Mechanisms

The G-33 group assembling a set of developing countries, that includes China, India, and Indonesia as well as many smaller economies, had argued in favour of a special safeguard mechanism that will allow developing countries to raise tariffs temporarily to respond to sudden import surges and price depressions. Countries such as Australia, Brazil, and the US wanted a cut in tariffs to go with SSM.

The new decision states that developing countries will “have the right to have recourse” to a special safeguard mechanism “as envisaged under paragraph 7 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration.

It also says that WTO members will pursue negotiations on a special safeguard mechanism for developing country members in dedicated negotiating sessions of the WTO agriculture committee.

Export Competition – Financing, State Enterprises, Food Aid EU Discontinues Subsidies

This decision groups together export subsidies with other types of export support instruments that can distort competition: export credits, export credit guarantees and other types of export financing; exporting state trading enterprises; and food aid.

When the Doha talks were launched, the EU insisted that these other types of arrangements also be disciplined in parallel to efforts to phase out and ultimately eliminate export subsidies. The EU subsidised exports at very high levels – reaching €10 billion in 2000 - and since almost totally curbed.

Historically, the US has been the main provider of export credits and food aid, while Canada, New Zealand and Australia have operated exporting state trading enterprises, some of which have since been privatised.

While the EU has discontinued export subsidies for most products, Switzerland, Norway, and Canada still notify support to the WTO, and some developing countries such as India or Turkey also provide this type of support but have not formally notified it to the trade body.

Although the Hong Kong ministerial declaration has said that developing countries should be allowed to provide Article 9.4 export subsidies – related mostly to marketing and internal transportation - for five years after export subsidies are eliminated, the legal authority for doing so under the Agreement on Agriculture has already expired.

Export Subsidies – End by 2018

Under the decision, developed countries will immediately eliminate their remaining agricultural export subsidies. These types of payments have long been seen as particularly trade-distorting, and already prohibited for manufactured goods. At the Hong Kong ministerial conference in 2005, members agreed that these payments would be eliminated by 2013, although the wider stalemate on the Doha agenda meant that this deadline was missed.

A footnote provides an exception until 2020 for developed countries that provide these subsidies on “processed products, dairy products, and swine meat,” to accommodate countries such as Switzerland and Canada that still use this type of support. The exception nonetheless would require the countries concerned not to export these products to least developed countries.

Developing countries must also eliminate their export subsidies by the end of 2018. Again, a footnote provides an exception until 2022 for some countries which have notified their support to the WTO.

An extended 2023 deadline is also provided for developing countries to use export subsidies for transport and marketing, which were originally covered under article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture. The arrangement is in keeping with other WTO clauses providing “special and differential treatment” to developing countries - often in the form of longer implementation periods for commitments. Least developed countries and net food importing developing countries will be allowed to do so until 2030.

Special arrangements are made for export subsidies on cotton. Developed countries would have to immediately implement their export subsidy commitments for this product, and developing countries would have until January 2017 to do so. More ambitious disciplines on cotton have long been a special demand of West African cotton-producing countries in the C-4 - Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali.

Export Credits, Export Credit Guarantees, or Insurance Programmes–18 Months Limit

The decision says that maximum credit repayment periods for developed countries would be eighteen months. The EU, Brazil, and other members had proposed nine month repayment periods under certain conditions. Although current US legislation allows repayment periods of up to 24 months, actual practice is believed to be 18 months.

Developing countries would initially also be allowed to extend credit for longer periods of up to 36 months, although this would be gradually reduced to 18 months over the course of a four-year implementation period.

Exporting State Trading Enterprises

The decision states that WTO members must ensure that exporting state trading enterprises do not operate in a manner that circumvents any other disciplines. This could be interpreted as meaning that these enterprises must not be allowed to operate in a way that effectively subsidises exports once the relevant deadlines in the export subsidy section of the text have expired.

A “best endeavours” clause would also commit members to making their best efforts to ensure that any export monopoly powers exerted by these bodies do not distort trade, the text says.

Food Aid

New language on food aid would commit WTO members to refrain from providing in-kind food aid where this might cause an adverse effect on local or regional production of the same or substitute products. The decision would also require them to ensure that international food aid does not unduly impact established, functioning commercial markets of agricultural commodities.

The decision would also establish new commitments affecting the extent to which countries would be allowed to “monetise” food aid - meaning for donors to sell in-kind food in recipient countries so as to raise funds for development projects.

The text would require WTO members to monetise international food aid “only where there is a demonstrable need” for transport purposes, or where monetisation is used to redress food deficit requirements or “insufficient agricultural production situations” which give rise to hunger and malnutrition in least developed and net food-importing countries. Other requirements are also included in the decision - such as for a market analysis to take place before monetisation occurs.

Public Stockholding – Not in Doha Process

On public stockholding, the G-33 group of developing countries has argued that current farm subsidy rules unfairly constrain their ability to purchase food at administered prices as part of their public programmes for food security purposes. The 2013 Bali ministerial saw WTO members agree not to challenge these schemes under the trade body’s dispute settlement process, and members agreed a year later that this arrangement would apply until a permanent solution is reached.

The G-33 have argued that price inflation over the last two decades have eroded the degree of flexibility they have to provide farm subsidies, even if purchases are made at administered prices that are below the level of international market prices.

The new text says that WTO members note the Bali decision, and also reaffirm a November 2014 decision extending the arrangement until a permanent solution is reached.

Today’s agreement also says that negotiations will be held on the subject in dedicated negotiating sessions of the WTO’s agriculture committee - but that these will be distinct from Doha negotiations.

Cotton – Developing Countries including China to provide Market Access

African countries have long sought stricter disciplines on cotton, and in particular in the area of domestic support.

The new agreement says that developed countries shall grant “to the extent provided for in their respective preferential trade arrangements” duty free and quota free market access for least developed country cotton exports, from 1 January 2016 onwards.

Developing countries “declaring themselves in a position to do so” would undertake the same commitment - and a footnote clarifies that this would include China, both for general market access commitments and also in their preferential trade agreements.  In the past, the US has often argued that China ought to undertake market access commitments as part of a broader sectoral agreement in this area. The most recent proposal from the C-4 group would also have included separate market access commitments for developing countries, including China.

An annexed product list would also specify which other cotton-related products would benefit from similar market access treatment.

Substantive advances for LDC issues– 75% Foreign Material Allowed

LDCs had repeatedly voiced concerns that these preferential rules of origin are often too restrictive and impose onerous compliance burdens, making it difficult for them to take full advantage of existing preferential margins.

The decision adopted in Nairobi now sets a timeframe for preference-granting members to undertake the commitments contained in the decision by 31 December 2016.

Regarding the value addition threshold, the document allows for the use of materials not originating from an LDC to make up to 75 percent of the final value of a product for it to qualify for preferential treatment. Some observers consider, however, that 75 percent non-originating material is in fact still prohibitive, given modern manufacturing methods based on global value chains which require in some cases only very little domestic content.

Services Waiver

Discussions on the services waiver for LDCs – which had proved difficult on certain technical aspects early in the morning yesterday – eventually led to a compromise on the draft text proposed by Rwandan Minister of Trade and Industry François Kanimba, who was facilitating those talks.

The draft text adopted in Nairobi provides for an extension of the existing services waiver until 31 December 2030.

The text also contains provisions related to the provision of technical assistance and initiation of a process to review the operation of notified preferences.

Special and differential treatment

Discussions on special and differential treatment (S&DT) continued to prove divisive on Friday, before ultimately collapsing. The proponents met yesterday morning to “essentially restate their positions and even backslide,” said one developed country trade delegate.

Various consultations took place on the subject, however issues related to balance of payments, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, safeguards, LDC-specific issues and also tariff negotiations have been cited as being particularly problematic.

The revised text presented by the facilitator in this issue, WTO Deputy-Director General Yonov Frederick Agah, was rejected by the G-90 and LDCs as it did not reflect any consensus, said one source close to the process. Instead, on Saturday morning, the G-90 submitted a draft decision which included text on future work on the issue, instructing the Committee on Trade and Development in Special Session (CTD SS) to continue to negotiate on the basis of specific proposals tabled by the G-90 last November with a view to achieving agreement on all proposals by 31 July 2016.

An outcome on S&DT could not be secured as members had “opposing interests,” explained Azevêdo.

“S&DT is an area that is horizontal, crossing across all WTO agreements. These are also difficult negotiations, as it is about the flexibilities in the agreement,” he said.

No Transparency on Anti-dumping

The first draft decision would have instructed the WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, through its Working Group on Implementation, to study and make recommendations to report to the General Council on a specific list of topics. This would be done in order to ensure “maximum possible” predictability and objectivity in implementing the relevant provisions in the Anti-Dumping (AD) Agreement. The Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures would also have been instructed to study these outcomes to determine their relevance and report conclusions to the General Council.

Some industry voices have cautioned that the proliferating use of trade remedies could threaten expansion or foreign investment in growing and salient industries, pointing to areas such as clean energy technologies. Other experts in Nairobi, however, considered that the steps proposed chair’s text would not have been a high-ambition outcome.

The document was panned by several nations, including Russia among others, who had also circulated its own revised draft decision on transparency issues in anti-dumping and countervailing measures on Friday morning. Moscow reportedly expressed disappointment that the chair’s text did not explicitly include a reference to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) in the instructions paragraph on implementation recommendations, as featured in its proposal.

Fisheries Subsidy to Stay

The second draft decision on fisheries subsidies would have decided to work towards completing negotiations within specific timeframe – potentially two years, though this was bracketed – for prohibitions on subsidies linked to illegal, unreported, or unregulated (IUU) fishing and those provided to any vessel or fishing activity “negatively affecting fish stocks that are in an overfished condition.”

This language was reportedly resisted in the final stretch on Friday by the 28-nation EU. The chair’s document would also have had members commit to a best endeavour standstill on introducing new fisheries subsidies contributing to overcapacity and overfishing in so far as these undermine the development livelihood and food security prospects of developing countries – a move rejected by China, given its estimated sizeable domestic support in this area. 

The draft decision also included additional fisheries subsidy programmes notifications commitments under the SCM Agreement with guidance on format outlined in an annex, taking into account each members’ resources and technical capacity. China and India reportedly struck out against the supplementary notifications on Friday afternoon, reiterating concerns these did not constitute a development outcome, due to the potential additional burden it could imposed on poorer countries.

Academy of Business Studies News Service