One
year of War in Ukraine. What has been the Impact on Global Trade?
Over the past year, the war in
Ukraine has caused immense human suffering. It has also had major economic repercussions,
especially on trade. However, trade has performed a lot better than first feared,
with many economies most affected by the conflict finding alternative sources of
supply.
A WTO Secretariat note issued
today assesses the impact of the war on international trade. It has two main messages:
·
First, international trade proved to be highly
resilient, thereby helping countries adjust to the economic effects of the war.
·
Second, the WTO played an important role in enabling
this resilience, and there are benefits to be reaped from further strengthening
the WTO.
Macroeconomic effects
The war has reduced trade growth,
but by much less than we initially feared. In October 2021, the WTO forecast that
goods trade would grow by 4.7 per cent in 2022.
At the onset of the war, we sharply
adjusted this forecast downward to between 2.4 and 3.0 per cent, with pessimistic
scenarios going as low as 0.5 per cent.
In October 2022, we again revised
our forecast upward to 3.5 percent, given that actual trade growth exceeded our
earlier estimates, proving the resilience of world trade over the past year.
Impact on Russian and Ukrainian
exports
Ukraine's exports decreased by
30 per cent from 2021 to 2022, with exports falling across the board. However, some
neighbouring countries, such as Poland and Hungary, actually increased their sourcing
from Ukraine, in particular for agricultural products.
Russia's exports increased by
15.6 per cent during the same time period. This was mostly driven by an increase
in prices, particularly for fuels, fertilizers and cereals. However, export volume may have declined slightly.
The biggest increase in Russian
exports was to China and India, while the largest decrease was in exports to the
United Kingdom and the United States. The biggest decline was in complex industrial
goods, such as motor vehicles and pharmaceuticals, as well as non-complex industrial
goods, such as wood products and steel.
Impact on countries highly dependent
on Russia and Ukraine
One of the key concerns at the
onset of the war was that there could be shortages in products where Russia and
Ukraine have a significant market share. There were particular concerns for wheat,
maize, sunflower products, fertilizers, fuels and palladium.
Such shortages have been largely
avoided. In particular, global trade volumes broadly remained at pre-war levels
after initial slumps in products such as wheat. Prices for goods most affected by
the war rose - contributing to inflation around the world - but by less than originally
feared.
Countries particularly dependent
on imports from Ukraine managed to find alternative sources of supply. For example,
Egypt's imports of wheat from Ukraine plunged an estimated 81 per cent in volume
terms in the first eight months of the war but it made up for this by importing
from alternative suppliers, such as the European Union.
There was also substitution across
products. For example, Türkiye responded to a decrease
in wheat imports by sharply increasing its rice imports. This underlines the importance
of the multilateral trading system provided by the WTO which allows trade to flow
where it is needed most.
The role of trade policy
The lower-than-expected rise
in food prices was in large part due to countries showing restraint in imposing
export restrictions. The WTO supported this effort. For example, the Ministerial
Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity adopted at the 12th Ministerial
Conference last June in Geneva committed WTO members to take concrete steps to keep
trade open for food and agricultural products.
However, the WTO's Trade Monitoring
Reports show an increase in export restrictions taken in the context of the war
so it is important to stay vigilant.
Simulations on the longer-term
outlook
Simulations by WTO economists
highlight the importance of maintaining a strong multilateral trading system. We
previously estimated that a decoupling of the world economy into a Western and Eastern
bloc would lead to real income losses of 5.4 per cent on average. We now estimate
the potential gains from a further reduction in tariffs and non-tariff measures
would be 3.2 per cent on average, raising the opportunity cost of fragmentation
into rival blocs to 8.7 per cent on average. The stakes are highest for least-developed
economies, with opportunity costs reaching as much as 11.3 per cent on average.
Let me end by reminding you of
the two main findings. First, international trade has proved to be highly resilient,
helping countries adjust to the economic effects of the war. Second, the WTO has
played an important role in enabling this resilience, and there are further benefits
to be gained from strengthening the multilateral trading system.