Trade
Growth to Slow Sharply in 2023 as Global Economy Faces Strong Headwinds
World trade is expected to lose momentum
in the second half of 2022 and remain subdued in 2023 as multiple shocks weigh on
the global economy. WTO economists now predict global merchandise trade volumes
will grow by 3.5% in 2022—slightly better than the 3.0% forecast in April. For 2023,
however, they foresee a 1.0% increase—down sharply from the previous estimate of
3.4%.
·
World merchandise trade volume
is expected to grow 3.5% in 2022 before slowing to 1.0% in 2023 (revised down from
3.4%).
·
World GDP at market exchange
rates will increase by 2.8% in 2022 and by 2.3% in 2023 (revised down from 3.2%).
·
Trade and output will be weighed
down by several related shocks, including the war in Ukraine, high energy prices,
inflation, and monetary tightening.
·
Merchandise exports of the CIS
region fell 10.4% quarter-on-quarter in Q2 while imports plunged 21.7%.
·
The Middle East will have the
strongest trade volume growth of any region in 2022 on both the export side (14.6%)
and the import side (11.1%).
·
The value of merchandise trade
in U.S. dollars was up 17% year-on-year in the second quarter of 2022.
·
Energy prices rose 78% year-on-year
in August while food prices were up 11%, grain prices were up 15% and fertilizer
prices were up 60%.
World trade
is expected to lose momentum in the second half of 2022 and remain subdued in 2023
as multiple shocks weigh on the global economy. WTO economists now predict global
merchandise trade volumes will grow by 3.5% in 2022—slightly better than the 3.0%
forecast in April. For 2023, however, they foresee a 1.0% increase—down sharply
from the previous estimate of 3.4%.
Import demand
is expected to soften as growth slows in major economies for different reasons.
In Europe, high energy prices stemming from the Russia-Ukraine war will squeeze
household spending and raise manufacturing costs. In the United States, monetary
policy tightening will hit interest-sensitive spending in areas such as housing,
motor vehicles and fixed investment. China continues to grapple with COVID-19 outbreaks
and production disruptions paired with weak external demand. Finally, growing import
bills for fuels, food and fertilizers could lead to food insecurity and debt distress
in developing countries.
"Policymakers
are confronted with unenviable choices as they try to find an optimal balance among
tackling inflation, maintaining full employment, and advancing important policy
goals such as transitioning to clean energy. Trade is a vital tool for enhancing
the global supply of goods and services, as well as for lowering the cost of getting
to net-zero carbon emissions," Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala said.
"While
trade restrictions may be a tempting response to the supply vulnerabilities that
have been exposed by the shocks of the past two years, a retrenchment of global
supply chains would only deepen inflationary pressures, leading to slower economic
growth and reduced living standards over time. What we need is a deeper, more diversified
and less concentrated base for producing goods and services. In addition to boosting
economic growth, this would contribute to supply resilience and long-term price
stability by mitigating exposure to extreme weather events and other localized disruptions.
The success of the WTO's 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) in June is proof that
with sufficient political will, members can cooperate and move forward together."
The new WTO
forecast estimates world GDP at market exchange rates will grow by 2.8% in 2022
and 2.3% in 2023 — the latter is 1.0 percentage points lower than what was previously
projected.
In their April
forecast, released only weeks after the start of the war in Ukraine, WTO economists
had to rely on simulations to generate reasonable growth assumptions, in the absence
of hard data about the war's impact. As events have unfolded, the WTO's GDP projections
for 2022 turned out to be broadly correct. The estimates for 2023, however, now
appear overly optimistic, as energy prices have skyrocketed, inflation has become
more broad-based, and the war shows no sign of letting up.
If the current
forecast is realized, trade growth will slow sharply but remain positive in 2023.
It should be noted that there is a high degree of uncertainty associated with the
forecast due to shifting monetary policy in advanced economies and the unpredictable
nature of the Russia-Ukraine war. Chart 1 shows quarterly world merchandise trade
volume through 2023 with error bands around the forecast period. If current assumptions
hold, trade growth in 2022 could end up between 2.0% and 4.9%. If the downside risks
materialize, trade growth in 2023 could then be as low as -2.8%. If the surprises
are on the upside, however, trade growth next year could be high as 4.6%. Trade
could also finish outside of these bounds if any of the underlying assumptions change.
The Ukraine
crisis has pushed up prices for primary commodities, particularly fuels, food, and
fertilizers. These are illustrated by Chart 2, which shows global commodity price
indices on the left and natural gas prices by region on the right. In August, energy
prices were up 78% year-on-year, led by natural gas, which was up 250%. The 36%
increase in the price of crude oil over the same period was small by comparison
but still significant for consumers.
Natural gas
prices have diverged strongly across regions, with European prices up 350% year-on-year
in August. U.S. prices were up 120% in the same month but remained well below European
levels (US$ 8.80 per million Btu compared to US$ 70.00 in Europe). European demand
for liquified natural gas (LNG) to supplement reduced supplies from the Russian
Federation has also pushed up energy costs in Asia, where the price of LNG was up
87% in August. European gas prices have moderated recently, falling 34% between
31 August and 23 September, but they remain high by historical standards. Oil prices
have also receded from recent peaks, possibly indicating weaker global demand rather
than an improved supply situation.
Food prices
in US dollar terms have also risen sharply due to the fact that the Russian Federation
and Ukraine are both major suppliers of grains and fertilizers. This raises food
security concerns in many countries, particularly low-income ones that tend to spend
a large fraction of household income on food. Many currencies have also fallen against
the dollar in recent months, making food and fuels even more expensive in national
currency terms.
Global grain
prices in August were up 15% year-on-year while wheat alone was up 18%. This marks
an improvement over April, when grains had increased 33% and wheat had risen 76%.
Potentially more worrying for the future are fertilizer prices, which were up 60%
year-on-year in August after nearly tripling since 2020. Reduced fertilizer imports
and use could reduce crop yields and increase food insecurity next year.
While the
supply situation for grains may not be as dire as some had feared at the start of
the Ukraine war, it is still a cause for concern. This is illustrated by Chart 3,
which shows the estimated value and volume of world trade in wheat. In July the
volume of traded wheat was down nearly 20% compared to March but only 4% year-on-year.
Underlying data suggest that some countries have responded to higher prices by reducing
consumption and imports. Since March, quantities of imported wheat are down year-on-year
in Bolivia (-69%), Jordan (-41%), Zambia (‑38%), Nigeria (-37%), and Ecuador
(‑30%), among others.
Chart 4 below
shows quarterly merchandise trade volume developments and projections by region
from 2019 to 2023. The CIS region suffered a strong 10.4% quarter-on quarter export
decline in Q2 of 2022 as sanctions against the Russian Federation started to bite.
Exports from South America, Africa and especially the Middle East beat expectations
in the first half of the year, helping to make up for reduced shipments from the
CIS region. Exports from North America, Europe and Asia in the first half of the
year were broadly in line with expectations.
On the import
side, the CIS region plunged 21.7% during the second quarter of 2022, probably as
a result of the Russian Federation's exclusion from the SWIFT payments system. Imports
by other resource rich regions (South America, Africa and the Middle East) came
in stronger than expected, as higher commodity prices inflated export revenues,
allowing countries in these regions to import more. North America and Europe recorded
stronger than expected import growth in the first half of 2022 but Asian imports
stagnated, registering year-on-year growth of just 0.7% in the first half.
The WTO's
current forecast of 3.5% growth in the volume of world merchandise trade in 2022
is close to but slightly stronger than the previous estimate of 3.0% from last April,
but the difference is mostly explained by statistical revisions and the availability
of new data. The Middle East is expected to record the strongest export growth of
any WTO region this year (14.6%), followed by Africa (6.0%), North America (3.4%),
Asia (2.9%), Europe (1.8%) and South America (1.6%). In contrast, CIS exports should
decline by 5.8% for the year. The Middle East also had the fastest trade volume
growth on the import side (11.1%), followed by North America (8.5%), Africa (7.2%),
South America (5.9%), Europe (5.4%), Asia (0.9%) and CIS (-24.7%).
One notable
feature of Table 1 is the resilience of trade growth in the Middle East and Africa
in 2022. These regions should see small declines in exports next year, but imports
will remain strong, each set to grow by 5.7%. The CIS region is expected to post
a large growth rate for imports next year, over 9%, but if this happens it will
be mostly due to the reduced base for 2022. Other regions can expect modest growth
in both exports and imports in 2023.
These projections
incorporate mixed-data sampling (MIDAS) techniques that use higher frequency data
to improve forecasting accuracy. Specifically, monthly data on container throughput
are exploited to capture the effects of port congestion and supply disruptions in
the United States and China. Taking this information into account had a small positive
impact on imports by North America and Asia in 2022, reflecting the clearance of
backlogs at U.S. West Coast ports and increased container handling in Chinese ports
following pandemic-related stoppages earlier in the year.
Risks to the
forecast are numerous and inter-related. Major central banks are already raising
interest rates in a bid to tame inflation but overshooting on tightening could trigger
recessions in some countries, which would weigh on imports. Alternatively, central
banks might not do enough to bring inflation down, possibly necessitating stronger
interventions in the future. High interest rates in advanced economies could trigger
capital flight from emerging economies, unsettling global financial flows. Escalation
of the Russia-Ukraine war could also undermine business and consumer confidence
and destabilize the global economy. An underappreciated risk would be the decoupling
of major economies from global supply chains. This would exacerbate supply shortages
in the near term and reduce productivity over the longer term.
The WTO's
trade forecasts are issued together with quarterly and annual trade statistics in
nominal U.S. dollar terms. These can be downloaded from the WTO's online database
at stats.wto.org.
Chart 5 below
shows year-on-year growth in merchandise exports over the last three quarters in
value terms. It also compares the value of
exports in the first half of 2022 to exports in the first half of 2019, before the
start of the pandemic. It shows that total merchandise trade was up 17% year-on-year
in the second quarter of 2022, as compared to 22% year-on-year in the fourth quarter
of 2021. Trade in the first half of 2022 was also up 32% compared to 2019. The main
takeaway is that because of changes in prices, merchandise trade values are growing
at double digit rates even as trade growth in volume terms remains in the low single
digits.
WTO quarterly
statistics on commercial services trade for the second quarter have not been released
yet, but monthly data through July provide an indication of trends for major economies
(Chart 6). Exports of travel and transport services rebounded strongly in many countries
as pandemic-related restrictions have eased. China is an exception, with travel
spending held back by the country's zero-COVID policy. Exports of other commercial
services (a category that includes financial and business services) grew at a modest
pace, partly due to the fact that they did not decline much during the pandemic.
The WTO tracks
a number of indicators to identify current trends in merchandise and commercial
services trade. Some of these are presented below to provide additional context
to the forecast.
Purchasing
managers' indices (PMIs) are monthly economic indicators based on business surveys.
J.P. Morgan aggregates PMIs from over 40 countries into a global manufacturing PMI,
with values greater than 50 indicating expansion and values less than 50 denoting
contraction (Chart 7). The headline PMI index fell to a 26-month low of 50.3 in
August, just above the threshold value of 50 separating expansion from contraction.
Meanwhile, the sub-index representing new export orders fell to 47.0, signalling
contraction. This suggests that global manufacturing activity has stalled, and that
goods trade will continue to slow in the coming months.
Other sub-indices
of the PMI cast light on the state of global supply chains. An index representing
input prices fell from 71.6 in April to 61.1 in August. Another index of final goods
prices dropped from 63.8 to 56.7 over the same period. Together, these suggest that
inflationary pressures, while still high, may have peaked. Delivery times also shortened
in August and stocks of finished goods rose. A few months ago, these would have
been seen as positive indications that supply chain pressures were easing, but today
they could signal that global demand is weakening.
The RWI/ISL
container throughput index tracks global goods trade quite closely. Although the
index remained near its all-time high in July, it has been mostly flat since October
2020. Throughput of Chinese ports dipped in the spring due to pandemic-related lockdowns,
but traffic rebounded again after these measures were relaxed. The decline in China
was partly compensated by increased container handling at U.S. ports, which had
previously experienced severe congestion. Overall, the index suggests continued
stagnation in merchandise trade.
The WTO does
not forecast services trade, but Chart 6 shows that travel and transport are its
most dynamic components. This is backed up by data on international flights from
the OpenSky network (Chart 9). Daily commercial flights (including those within
the European Union) finally exceeded pre-pandemic levels this summer but in late
August they turned down slightly. Whether this pause is temporary or long-lasting
remains to be seen.