War and Sanctions Threaten to Thrust Russia’s Economy Back in Time
More than nine months after the invasion, neither the war
effort nor the economy has collapsed, and the economic pain is still limited
for many Russians.
·
More than 1,000 multinational companies curtailed
operations in Russia because of its invasion of Ukraine.
·
the most coordinated and deepest
economic sanctions in modern history
·
Russian industries are highly dependent
on Western components.
·
Russia’s government was better prepared
to withstand the sanctions than many in the West expected.
·
A combination of high oil revenues,
large currency reserves and an expert team of economic officials has allowed
Putin to soften the blow.
Valery Volodin, a welder at a sprawling Volkswagen plant in
western Russia, relaxed for most of the summer at his dacha, or weekend house,
planting his garden and looking after his children. Volodin,
41, had little choice: The car factory closed down in March, joining more than 1,000 multinational companies curtailed
operations in Russia because of its invasion of Ukraine.
Since then, he has
been sitting at home while Volkswagen looks for a buyer. He goes into the
plant, in Kaluga’s industrial zone, once a month to collect 50,000 rubles, about $800, a payment required by Russian labor law that is the equivalent of two-thirds of his
previous salary.
His experience is
playing out across Russia for hundreds of thousands of workers after the West
imposed sweeping economic sanctions that were intended to hobble Moscow’s
ability to wage war and to undercut public support for President Vladimir
Putin.
More than nine months
after the invasion, neither the war effort nor the economy has collapsed, and
the economic pain is still limited for many Russians. Putin has avoided any
substantive domestic pressure that would threaten his leadership. But the
impact of what some have described as the most
coordinated and deepest economic sanctions in modern history is evident in
communities across Russia — and the worst may be yet to come.
The sanctions have
stymied Russia’s faltering attempts to modernise its economy along Western
lines and to catch up to European living standards after the fall of the Soviet
Union, said Vladislav Inozemtsev, the
Washington-based director of the Center for
Post-Industrial Studies, a Russian research group. That has dimmed the hope
that the country could become a modern, prosperous nation in the near term.
The most visible and
dramatic impact has been on manufacturing, a sector that employs 10 million
Russians and that has been the centerpiece of Putin’s
ambitious program to diversify the economy away from reliance on oil and gas
exports. The auto industry accounts for a large percentage of those workers:
Carmakers employ 300,000 Russians, according to the country’s statistics
agency, and the association representing their interests say that up to 3.5
million more work in related industries.
By September, output
in the auto industry was down 77% year over year, while car sales have
plummeted 60% compared with the same period in 2021. A primary reason is that Russian industries are highly dependent on Western
components. Even Putin has acknowledged the problem, admitting last week
that, in some sectors, dependence on imported parts is as high as 90%.
To adapt, Russia is
turning inward, cutting ties with the rest of the world and moving toward an
economic model similar to one adopted by Iran, where political legitimacy rests
on providing citizens with the essentials rather than spurring transformative
growth, Inozemtsev said.
Russia’s
government was better prepared to withstand the sanctions than many in the West
expected.
Since the start of
the war, the International Monetary Fund has revised its economic outlook for Russia
upward twice and is forecasting a 3.5% decline in gross domestic product this
year, similar to the government’s projections. This decline, while a major
reversal from prewar growth expectations, stands in
sharp contrast to the double digits collapse of Venezuela’s economic output
after a wave of American sanctions in 2019.
“Sanctions have not
destroyed the resilience of the Russian financial system, nor have they
impacted macroeconomic stability,” Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin
said last week during a government meeting.
A
combination of high oil revenues, large currency reserves and an expert team of
economic officials has allowed Putin to soften the blow —
much to the frustration of some Western leaders who had hoped the sanctions
would have more bite by now.
But the loss of
investment, technology and skills caused by the sanctions is likely to echo
across generations, depriving many Russians of a chance at a better economic
future, experts said.
Those were boom times
for Kaluga, an industrial region about 120 miles south of Moscow. The former
governor actively courted Western investors, learning English and building a
modern airport with several flights a week to Germany. He transformed a
regional economy that had been 80% oriented toward the Soviet military
industrial complex into one connected with the West. Pharmaceutical companies
flocked to the Kaluga region, which has a population of 1 million, and so did
auto manufacturers.
Volkswagen hired
about 4,200 workers. Volvo and Stellantis, which produced
and sold the Peugeot, Citroën, Opel, Jeep and Fiat brands in Russia, also
established operations in the region. An ecosystem of suppliers and related
industries sprang up to serve them, employing at least 25,000 people, according
to Dmitry Trudovoy, chair of the Independent Workers’
Association trade union. Courses in German and other foreign languages at the
local university were a pipeline to an office job with the companies.
It seemed as if a
new, modern business model was being constructed step by step in the region, a
hint of how Russia’s economy might evolve.
By 2020, Volkswagen’s
output alone represented about 13% of the Kaluga region’s entire industrial
production.
Kaluga’s industrial
output fell 30% between February and July this year compared with the same
period the year before, according to Rosstat,
Russia’s statistics agency, becoming among the regions hit hardest.
Russian state firms
and the government have vowed to replace the lost output with local brands. But
there have been multiple signs of regression. In June, AvtoVAZ,
which makes Russia’s best-known domestic car brand, the Lada, announced that
its new cars would meet only 1996 emissions standards and have no
passenger-side air bags.
In a symbolic move,
an AvtoVAZ affiliate, Kamaz,
announced that it would use a Moscow plant vacated by Renault after the
invasion to relaunch the production of a Soviet-era car brand, Moskvich, or Muscovite, which had long been an almost
comical byword for the deficiencies of communist consumer goods.
Kamaz
claims it will produce 50,000 “modern, comfortable, high-quality and safe” cars
in the plant next year, including many with electric motors. To aid these
efforts, the Russian government plans to channel about $500 million to domestic
carmakers.
But modern history
offers few examples of successful attempts to replace imported Western
technology with local substitutes, said Inozemtsev,
the economist. Russian companies lack the know-how and skilled workers to
replace Western capital in technology-intensive sectors. Relying on homegrown
substitutes will result in “primitivization,” Inozemtsev said.
Production will not
disappear, he said, but it will gradually degrade, resulting in lower quality
and quantity of products that will progressively reduce the standard of life of
Russians.
In Kaluga, the
collapse of the auto industry is having wide-ranging collateral effects. The
real estate market ground to a halt after the war started, said Kirill Gusev,
editor of the online real estate site Kaluga House. It started improving over
the summer as people got used to a new normal, but then collapsed after Putin
announced a military call-up of hundreds of thousands of men in September.
“After the
mobilization, the banks stopped giving out loans because the clients could be
called up,” he added.