Democrats in Congress Roped into Halt Chips Access to China

[ABS News Service/11.11.2026]

Congressional scrutiny of advanced AI chip exports is turning to the integrity of the government’s decision process: who authorized shipments, what intelligence informed those decisions and whether Nvidia’s access to senior officials affected enforcement.

Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer (NY) said yesterday that the situation makes it clear the Congress needs to pass bipartisan legislation to cut off China’s access to advanced US technology.

“Myself and colleagues have been pushing on this for quite a while, and I urge my Republican colleagues to come together with us to pass this legislation while we still can. And I call on the Trump Administration to brief the Senate and House intelligence committees immediately on the PRC’s efforts to spy on Nvidia and other US AI companies,” he said. “We also need answers on Nvidia’s influence campaign and how [it] affected the Trump administration’s national security decisions, including the loosening – the loosening – of key export controls.”

House Foreign Affairs Committee ranking Democrat Gregory Meeks (NY), Vice Ranking Democrat Gabe Amo (RI) and South and Central Asia Subcommittee Ranking Democrat Sydney Kamlager-Dove (Calif) demanded answers from Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick on Monday.

Their letter calls for an immediate halt to advanced AI chip exports to China and asks what Commerce knew about reported Chinese intelligence connections, when officials learned of them and why exports continued. “We call on the Department of Commerce to immediately halt exports of advanced artificial intelligence chips to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) amid recent reporting about PRC intelligence activities and of potential PRC access to these critical national security technologies. You cannot claim to be protecting American leadership in artificial intelligence while allowing our most advanced technology to reach a strategic competitor. National security must come before corporate sales targets,” they wrote.

Nvidia’s Influence

The oversight demand gains significance from reporting that Commerce’s investigation of Megaspeed, a Singapore-based Nvidia customer suspected of diverting chips to China, was halted and transferred to the Justice Department after Nvidia contacted investigators.

According to The New York Times, Nvidia General Counsel Tim Teter invoked permission from Under Secretary Jeffrey Kessler when approaching agents about the inquiry.

Officials expressed concern about possible compromise of the investigation. Justice subsequently requested that Commerce pause its work and said it would conduct a criminal inquiry.

Commerce maintains that its actions followed procedure; an official told the Times Mr. Kessler neither directed agents to disclose information nor dictated which meetings they should take.

The Financial Times separately reported that Megaspeed executive Alice Huang pitched investors on a Southeast Asian data-center project by emphasizing access to Nvidia chips and a commercial relationship with Alibaba.

In their letter to Mr. Lutnick, the House lawmakers asked a series of questions:

· Were you, Under Secretary for Industry and Security Jeffrey Kessler, or other senior Commerce and BIS officials aware of intelligence linking Alice Huang and Megaspeed to PRC efforts to obtain advanced Nvidia chips? Please identify the date, participants, and substance of each briefing.

· Did you, Under Secretary for Industry and Security Jeffrey Kessler, or other senior Commerce and BIS officials communicate with Secretary of State Marco Rubio or a member of his staff regarding Alice Huang, Megaspeed, or its affiliates? If so, please specify the date and information shared.

· Did the intelligence community or any other federal agency recommend that Commerce investigate, suspend, or restrict exports to Megaspeed or its affiliates? If so, what action did the Department take in response?

· Has BIS approved exports of Nvidia Blackwell chips or other advanced AI chips to Megaspeed, its affiliates, or entities operating its data centers? If so, please identify the recipients, quantities, and dates of approval and exports.

· What due diligence has BIS conducted into Megaspeed’s ownership, customers, business relationships, and end users? Has the Department determined whether PRC companies can access computing capacity powered by these chips?

· What licensing, reporting, and end-use verification requirements currently apply to advanced AI chip exports to Southeast Asian countries? How does BIS prevent PRC entities from accessing restricted computing capacity through third-country data centers?

· What due diligence has BIS conducted into New Matrix?

· What additional safeguards, if any, has BIS implemented to ensure that the companies they are evaluating are not and will not use the chips in violation of BIS’s end-use prohibitions?

· What additional safeguards, if any, has the Department implemented to ensure that decisions to approve advanced chip exports reflect national-security assessments and not simply the commercial interests of US technology companies?