U.S. Imposes Fresh Sanctions on Iran-Linked Weapons Networks

· On 21 April 2026, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 14 individuals, entities, and aircraft linked to Iran, Türkiye, and the UAE.

· Action targets networks involved in procuring and transporting weapons and components for Iran’s regime.

· Sanctions are part of the U.S. campaign “Economic Fury” to counter Iran’s missile and UAV (drone) capabilities.

· Iran is attempting to rebuild its ballistic missile capacity and increasingly using Shahed-series UAVs for attacks, including on energy infrastructure.

Key Targets and Activities

· Drone Procurement Network:

o Linked to Pishgam Electronic Safeh Company (PESC).

o Involved in sourcing servomotors and carbon fiber used in Shahed-136 drones.

o Individuals sanctioned for facilitating payments, logistics, and procurement.

· Missile Propellant Supply Chain:

o Türkiye-based firm Emti Fiber Textile Import Export Trade Limited Company supplied cotton linters (used to produce nitrocellulose for rocket propellants).

o Linked to Iran’s missile development ecosystem.

· Iran-Based Procurement Entities:

o Action taken against Adak Pargas Pars Trading Company and its leadership for sourcing sodium perchlorate (missile propellant precursor).

Mahan Air Network

· Mahan Air targeted for transporting weapons and UAV systems.

· Associated companies and officials sanctioned, including:

o Sepehr Kaveh Kish International Trading Company (owner/controller).

o Saman Air Services Company (logistics support).

o UAE-based Chabok FZCO for supplying aircraft components.

· Two aircraft (B777: EP-MTE and EP-MTB) identified as blocked property.

Legal Basis

· Sanctions imposed under:

o Executive Order 13382 (WMD proliferation).

o Executive Order 13224 (counter-terrorism).

· Aligns with U.S. efforts under National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 and UN-related restrictions on Iran.

Implications

· All U.S.-linked assets of designated entities are blocked.

· U.S. persons are prohibited from transactions with sanctioned parties.

· Secondary sanctions risk for foreign financial institutions dealing with listed entities.

· Violations may lead to civil or criminal penalties.

· OFAC emphasized that sanctions aim to change behavior, and entities may seek removal from the sanctions list through a formal process.

[ABS News Service/21.04.2026]

On 21 April, 2026, the United States is imposing sanctions on eight individuals and four entities that operate multiple procurement networks supporting Iran’s UAV and ballistic missile programs and U.S.-designated Mahan Air. The United States is also identifying two aircraft as blocked property of Mahan Air, which has previously transported Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operatives, weapons, equipment, and funds.

These designations support Operation Epic Fury and President Trump’s National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 directive to counter Iran’s weapons programs. Today’s action also supports the implementation of United Nations sanctions and restrictive measures on Iran, which were reimposed as a direct result of Iran’s “significant non-performance” of its nuclear commitments.

The United States will continue to use all available means to expose, disrupt, and counter Iran’s threatening activities to protect America’s interests.

The Department of the Treasury’s action was taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters, and E.O. 13224, as amended, which targets terrorist groups and their supporters.

Department of the Treasury’s press release dated April 21, 2026

Economic Fury Targets Iranian Missile and UAV Procurement Networks

Additionally, Sanctions Actors Tied to Iran’s Mahan Air, Which has Transported Weapons for the Iranian Regime

On 21 April, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is sanctioning 14 individuals, entities, and aircraft based in Iran, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for their involvement in procuring or transporting weapons or weapons components on behalf of the Iranian regime. As the United States continues to deplete Iran’s ballistic missile inventories, the regime is seeking to reconstitute its production capacity. Iran is increasingly relying on Shahed-series one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to target the United States and its allies, including energy infrastructure in the region. These designations support Economic Fury in response to the Iranian regime’s continued threats to global security.

“The Iranian regime must be held accountable for its extortion of global energy markets and indiscriminate targeting of civilians with missiles and drones,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “Under President Trump’s leadership, as part of Economic Fury, Treasury will continue to follow the money and target the Iranian regime’s recklessness and those who enable it.”

This action builds on OFAC’s firm implementation of National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, which directs the U.S. government to curtail Iran’s ballistic missile program, counter Iran’s development of asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities, deny Iran a nuclear weapon, and deny Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) access to assets and resources that sustain its destabilizing activities. Today’s action also represents Treasury’s fifth round of nonproliferation designations in support of the September 27, 2025 reimposition of United Nations (UN) sanctions and other restrictions on Iran, which occurred as a direct result of Iran’s “significant non-performance” of its nuclear commitments.

OFAC is taking this action pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators and their supporters, and E.O. 13224, as amended, which targets terrorist groups, their supporters, and those who aid acts of terrorism.

PISHGAM ELECTRONIC SAFEH COMPANY’S SHAHED UAV PROCUREMENT

OFAC is designating three individuals for their support to Iran-based Pishgam Electronic Safeh Company (PESC) and its chief executive officer (CEO), Iran-based Hamid Reza Janghorbani (Janghorbani). PESC has procured thousands of servomotors with one-way attack UAV applications, which have been found in downed Shahed-136 UAVs, for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (IRGC ASF SSJO). On September 27, 2023, OFAC designated PESC pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC ASF SSJO, and OFAC concurrently designated Janghorbani pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, PESC. The U.S. Department of State designated the IRGC ASF SSJO, which is involved in Iranian ballistic missile research and flight test launches, pursuant to E.O. 13382 on July 18, 2017 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery.

Kamal Sabah Balkhkanlu (Balkhkanlu) is a Tehran-based currency exchanger who has acted as a longtime payment facilitator for PESC’s efforts to procure carbon fiber and servomotors, which are items sought by Iran for its ballistic missile and UAV programs. Under Janghorbani’s guidance, Balkhkanlu utilized third-country bank accounts to transfer funds to PESC’s suppliers. Iranian national Mohammad Vahidi (Vahidi) is an associate of Janghorbani. As part of his procurement efforts on behalf of PESC, Janghorbani routed shipments of materials and equipment to a Dubai address associated with Vahidi. Iranian national Danial Khalili (Khalili) served as PESC’s agent facilitating the receipt and delivery of items procured through Janghorbani’s network.

Balkhkanlu is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, PESC. Vahidi and Khalili are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Janghorbani.

BALLISTIC MISSILE PROPELLANT PRECURSORS

OFAC is also acting against a Türkiye-based company for its support to Iran-based Pardisan Rezvan Shargh International Private Joint Stock Company (Pardisan Rezvan Shargh). OFAC designated Pardisan Rezvan Shargh on December 30, 2025 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, Mostafa Rostami Sani, who had procured dozens of metric tons of sodium perchlorate for Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI). PCI is an element of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) that is responsible for the import and export of chemical goods. OFAC designated PCI in July 2008, and the Department of State designated DIO pursuant to E.O. 13382 in March 2007. Both DIO and PCI are also subject to an asset freeze pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and UNSCR 1747, respectively. OFAC designated Mostafa Rostami Sani on December 30, 2025 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, PCI.

Emti Fiber Textile Import Export Trade Limited Company (Emti Fiber Textile) has completed hundreds of shipments of cotton linters to Pardisan Rezvan Shargh. Cotton linters are processed into nitrocellulose, which is used to improve the performance of solid propellant rocket motors. Solid propellant rocket motors are commonly used for ballistic missiles.

Emti Fiber Textile is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Pardisan Rezvan Shargh.

OFAC is also taking further action against Iran-based Adak Pargas Pars Trading Company (Adak Pargas Pars). On February 25, 2026, OFAC designated Adak Pargas Pars—which had facilitated U.S.-designated individual Marco Klinge’s (Klinge’s) efforts to procure sodium perchlorate, a ballistic missile propellant precursor, including for Iranian government customers such as PCI—pursuant to E.O. 13382. OFAC designated Klinge pursuant to E.O. 13382 on November 12, 2025 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, PCI.

Iran-based Hamidreza Roknifard is the chairman and a member of the board of directors of Adak Pargas Pars, and Iran-based Mostafa Roknifard is the vice chairman and a member of the board of directors of Adak Pargas Pars.

Hamidreza Roknifard and Mostafa Roknifard are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Adak Pargas Pars.

ARMS PROLIFERATOR MAHAN AIR

Lastly, OFAC is designating several persons for their connections to Mahan Air or companies linked to it. On October 12, 2011, OFAC designated Mahan Air pursuant to E.O. 13224 for providing financial, material, and technological support to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), which OFAC designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 in October 2007 for providing material support to multiple terrorist organizations. In December 2019, the U.S. Department of State designated Mahan Air pursuant to E.O. 13382.

Mahan Air is involved in Iran’s procurement and transport of UAV systems and weapons to and from Iran. Entities in jurisdictions including the UAE, Türkiye, Iraq, China, Thailand, Pakistan, and India have provided material, logistical, and other support to Mahan Air flights.

Mahan Air is a subsidiary of Iran-based Sepehr Kaveh Kish International Trading Company (Sepehr Kaveh Kish), which also serves as chairman of Mahan Air’s board of directors. Iran‑based GholamAbbas Ataei Aghdam is the chairman and a member of the board of directors of Sepehr Kaveh Kish, and Iran-based Jamshid Hosseinzadeh is a member of the board of directors of Sepehr Kaveh Kish. Iran-based Mohammad Hossein Mahdian manages passenger and cargo services for Mahan Air.

Iran-based Saman Air Services Company (Saman Air Services) is owned by Sepehr Kaveh Kish subsidiary Mahan Air, and the CEO and members of the board of directors of Saman Air Services all serve as members of the board of directors of Sepehr Kaveh Kish or as a manager for Mahan Air. In 2025, prior to the recognition of the new interim Venezuelan government, Saman Air Services facilitated the shipment of UAVs and weapons from Iran to Venezuela in coordination with Venezuelan state-owned airline Consorcio Venezolano de Industrias Aeronauticas y Servicios Aereos, S.A. (Conviasa). OFAC identified Conviasa pursuant to E.O. 13884 on February 7, 2020 for meeting the definition of Government of Venezuela.

Sepehr Kaveh Kish is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for owning or controlling, directly or indirectly, Mahan Air. Gholam Abbas Ataei Aghdam and Jamshid Hosseinzadeh are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being leaders or officials of Sepehr Kaveh Kish. Mohammad Hossein Mahdian is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mahan Air. Saman Air Services is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Sepehr Kaveh Kish.

Dubai-based Chabok FZCO has facilitated the procurement of sensors and other U.S.-origin aircraft components for Mahan Air in Iran.

Chabok FZCO is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Mahan Air.

In addition, OFAC is identifying two B777 aircraft that are owned and operated by Mahan Air: EP-MTE and EP-MTB.

EP-MTE and EP-MTB are being identified as property in which Mahan Air has an interest.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.

Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.