WTO Amber Box Limiting Support to Agri Spills Over, Hits $19.3bn
[ABS
News Service/18.11.2026]
Geneva – The United States appears to
have breached, for the first time, its Uruguay Round commitment to limit its
most trade-distorting agricultural subsidies, known as Amber Box support or
Aggregate Measurement of Support, to $19 billion during the marketing year from
October 1, 2024 to September 30, 2025.
According to the AMS notification in
document G/AG/N/USA/198 filed on November 10, Washington’s Current Total AMS
stands at $19.3 billion.
The apparent breach was triggered by a
new, one-time support measure under the Emergency Commodity Assistance Program,
through which the Trump Administration disbursed close to $10 billion to
producers of major crops, including corn and soybeans, among others, according
to figures provided in document G/AG/W/264.
By contrast, the United States provided
AMS support amounting to just over $9 billion in the previous marketing year,
well below its overall AMS ceiling.
Apart from the AMS breach, US domestic
support for cotton has almost doubled, rising to $2 billion in the latest
notification from $1 billion in the previous submission.
The surge in cotton subsidies has
serious international implications, as it directly affects the interests of the
Cotton-4 countries – Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad – which have been raising
strong concerns about US cotton subsidies since the WTO’s sixth Ministerial
Conference in Hong Kong in December 2005.
At that conference, trade ministers had
agreed to address cotton “ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically, within
the agriculture negotiations in relation to all trade-distorting policies
affecting the sector in all three pillars of market access, domestic support
and export competition, as specified in the Doha text and the July 2004
Framework text.”
Washington lost a major dispute over
upland cotton subsidies brought by Brazil at the WTO, when the Appellate Body
ruled against Washington’s trade-distorting cotton subsidies in 2005.
After securing that victory, Brazil
settled for a framework agreement that allowed Washington to buy its way out of
the dispute without having to reform its subsidies, paying a lump sum of $300
million, while Brazil forfeited $829 million in WTO-mandated sanctions against
US goods and services, according to former farm trade diplomats.
In advance of next week’s meeting of the
WTO Committee on Agriculture, Canada has posed several questions to the United
States seeking explanations about its farm support programs.
Canada said it “has taken note of a
series of recent U.S. announcements related to agricultural support measures
that, when considered together, create significant concern vis-à-vis the United
States' ongoing compliance with its domestic support commitments.”
According to Canada, “in July 2025, USDA
announced USD 16 billion in assistance through the Supplemental Disaster Relief
Program. The application deadline for this programme was extended to 30
September 2026.”
Canada further noted that “on 7 October
2026, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Rollins announced that the Agriculture Risk
Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) programmes will generate
approximately USD 13.8 billion in gross payments to eligible agricultural
producers for the 2025 crop year.”
Further, on 19 October 2026, “U.S.
President Trump and U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Rollins announced the Harvest
Fuel Relief Program, within which USDA will make USD 8 billion available for
one-time payments to farmers this harvest season to provide relief during
temporary market disruptions.”
Furthermore, “as of 1 November 2026, the
USDA Emergency Commodity Assistance Program Dashboard indicates that payments
under that programme are nearing USD 9.4 billion.”
Excessive
Subsidies to US Farmers
Canada complained that “taken together,
these programmes would appear to total more than USD 40 billion.” It also cited
the USDA's Farm Sector Income & Finances forecast, projected on 3 September
2026, which estimated that direct government farm payments would reach USD 47.4
billion in 2026, an increase of USD 19.5 billion from 2025.
According to Ottawa, several of these US
programs had previously been notified as non-product-specific support, while
others would also appear to fall into that category.
The United States notified approximately
$4 billion in non-product-specific support in its most recent DS:1
notification, covering the 2023/24 marketing year.
Against this backdrop, Canada posed
three questions to Washington:
1. Could the United States provide an
updated forecast of total direct payments to farmers for this year?
2. Could the United States confirm
whether each of the programmes identified above constitutes a distinct support
program and whether funding under each program has been, or is expected to be,
disbursed during 2026?
3. Could the United States explain how
the design and implementation of these programs will ensure continued
compliance with its WTO domestic support commitments?
Apart from the escalating US farm
subsidies, Canada also raised concerns about a US import ban on certain
Canadian products, imposed under Section 338 of the US Trade Act of 1930.
Canada said the import ban “followed the
imposition of U.S. tariffs implemented under the same domestic legislative
authority that appear to be in excess of the relevant bound rates in the U.S.
Schedule of Concessions.”
It added that “Canadian agricultural
products, including whey protein concentrates, modified whey, molasses and
certain beverages are among the products impacted by the import ban.”
Given “the long history of the United
States opposing measures that quantitatively limit imports, and longstanding
U.S. advocacy for the tariffication process that
resulted from the Uruguay Round and Agreement on Agriculture,” Canada asked
Washington if it could explain how this import ban complies with its
commitments under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture?
Brazil also questioned the United States
over its US Financial Assurance to Revitalize Markets (FARM) program.
Brazil said that “in April 2026, the
United States announced the FARM Initiative, expanding agricultural export
financing through enhanced GSM-102 guarantees and cooperation with the
Export-Import Bank (EXIM).”
The initiative apparently includes 100
percent payment guarantees in higher-risk markets and follows the introduction
of an 18-month single-payment option in February 2026.
According to Brazil, the “expansion of
government guarantees to 100% of payment obligations in higher-risk markets raises a question about the relationship between risk and
pricing.”
Moreover, Brazil asked “if the
additional coverage is intended precisely for transactions that commercial
lenders would otherwise be reluctant to finance, what evidence demonstrates
that the premiums charged adequately reflect the risks assumed by the US
Government?”
In particular, Brazil sought to know:
“how have the actuarial assumptions underlying GSM-102 been revised to account
for the new coverage conditions, considering the findings in WTO dispute
DS267(cotton dispute) and the self-financing requirements of the Nairobi
Ministerial Decision?”
Separately, Brazil questioned Washington
about the $8 billion Harvest Fuel Relief Program announced in October, which
provides additional assistance to US agricultural producers to compensate for
market disruptions and increased production costs.
Brazil said that “according to the USDA,
this new programme follows USD 12 billion in assistance under the Farmer Bridge
Assistance programme and approximately USD 14 billion in gross payments under
the Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) programmes in
2026.”
Brazil maintained that it “is concerned
about the cumulative effects of successive agricultural support programmes,
particularly where payments are linked to specific commodities, planted
acreage, production costs and market prices.”
Brazil’s
Questions
Against this backdrop, Brazil asked the
United States to answer the following questions:
·
Could
the United States provide a breakdown, by commodity, of the total support
provided or announced in 2026 under HFR, FBA, ARC and PLC, identifying the
amounts actually disbursed and any overlapping beneficiaries?
·
How
will HFR payments be classified under the Agreement on Agriculture? Does the
United States consider them exempt from reduction commitments? If so, under
which specific provisions of Annex 2 or Article 6?
·
Given
that HFR payments are calculated using commodity-specific planted acreage,
production costs and market prices, how does the United States demonstrate that
the program does not encourage production or distort competition in
international agricultural markets?
·
How
does the United States distinguish genuinely exceptional assistance from
recurring agricultural income support when successive programs compensate
producers for similar market disruptions and production costs?
·
What
is the estimated cumulative impact of these programs on US product-specific AMS
and Current Total AMS? Can the United States demonstrate that the additional
payments will remain within its WTO domestic support commitments?
Several other members, including India
and China, also sharply questioned US farm subsidies, which appear to be
excessively high and in violation of Washington’s Uruguay Round subsidy
commitments, according to people familiar with the developments.