WTO Amber Box Limiting Support to Agri Spills Over, Hits $19.3bn

[ABS News Service/18.11.2026]

Geneva – The United States appears to have breached, for the first time, its Uruguay Round commitment to limit its most trade-distorting agricultural subsidies, known as Amber Box support or Aggregate Measurement of Support, to $19 billion during the marketing year from October 1, 2024 to September 30, 2025.

According to the AMS notification in document G/AG/N/USA/198 filed on November 10, Washington’s Current Total AMS stands at $19.3 billion.

The apparent breach was triggered by a new, one-time support measure under the Emergency Commodity Assistance Program, through which the Trump Administration disbursed close to $10 billion to producers of major crops, including corn and soybeans, among others, according to figures provided in document G/AG/W/264.

By contrast, the United States provided AMS support amounting to just over $9 billion in the previous marketing year, well below its overall AMS ceiling.

Apart from the AMS breach, US domestic support for cotton has almost doubled, rising to $2 billion in the latest notification from $1 billion in the previous submission.

The surge in cotton subsidies has serious international implications, as it directly affects the interests of the Cotton-4 countries – Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad – which have been raising strong concerns about US cotton subsidies since the WTO’s sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in December 2005.

At that conference, trade ministers had agreed to address cotton “ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically, within the agriculture negotiations in relation to all trade-distorting policies affecting the sector in all three pillars of market access, domestic support and export competition, as specified in the Doha text and the July 2004 Framework text.”

Washington lost a major dispute over upland cotton subsidies brought by Brazil at the WTO, when the Appellate Body ruled against Washington’s trade-distorting cotton subsidies in 2005.

After securing that victory, Brazil settled for a framework agreement that allowed Washington to buy its way out of the dispute without having to reform its subsidies, paying a lump sum of $300 million, while Brazil forfeited $829 million in WTO-mandated sanctions against US goods and services, according to former farm trade diplomats.

In advance of next week’s meeting of the WTO Committee on Agriculture, Canada has posed several questions to the United States seeking explanations about its farm support programs.

Canada said it “has taken note of a series of recent U.S. announcements related to agricultural support measures that, when considered together, create significant concern vis-à-vis the United States' ongoing compliance with its domestic support commitments.”

According to Canada, “in July 2025, USDA announced USD 16 billion in assistance through the Supplemental Disaster Relief Program. The application deadline for this programme was extended to 30 September 2026.”

Canada further noted that “on 7 October 2026, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Rollins announced that the Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) programmes will generate approximately USD 13.8 billion in gross payments to eligible agricultural producers for the 2025 crop year.”

Further, on 19 October 2026, “U.S. President Trump and U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Rollins announced the Harvest Fuel Relief Program, within which USDA will make USD 8 billion available for one-time payments to farmers this harvest season to provide relief during temporary market disruptions.”

Furthermore, “as of 1 November 2026, the USDA Emergency Commodity Assistance Program Dashboard indicates that payments under that programme are nearing USD 9.4 billion.”

Excessive Subsidies to US Farmers

Canada complained that “taken together, these programmes would appear to total more than USD 40 billion.” It also cited the USDA's Farm Sector Income & Finances forecast, projected on 3 September 2026, which estimated that direct government farm payments would reach USD 47.4 billion in 2026, an increase of USD 19.5 billion from 2025.

According to Ottawa, several of these US programs had previously been notified as non-product-specific support, while others would also appear to fall into that category.

The United States notified approximately $4 billion in non-product-specific support in its most recent DS:1 notification, covering the 2023/24 marketing year.

Against this backdrop, Canada posed three questions to Washington:

1. Could the United States provide an updated forecast of total direct payments to farmers for this year?

2. Could the United States confirm whether each of the programmes identified above constitutes a distinct support program and whether funding under each program has been, or is expected to be, disbursed during 2026?

3. Could the United States explain how the design and implementation of these programs will ensure continued compliance with its WTO domestic support commitments?

Apart from the escalating US farm subsidies, Canada also raised concerns about a US import ban on certain Canadian products, imposed under Section 338 of the US Trade Act of 1930.

Canada said the import ban “followed the imposition of U.S. tariffs implemented under the same domestic legislative authority that appear to be in excess of the relevant bound rates in the U.S. Schedule of Concessions.”

It added that “Canadian agricultural products, including whey protein concentrates, modified whey, molasses and certain beverages are among the products impacted by the import ban.”

Given “the long history of the United States opposing measures that quantitatively limit imports, and longstanding U.S. advocacy for the tariffication process that resulted from the Uruguay Round and Agreement on Agriculture,” Canada asked Washington if it could explain how this import ban complies with its commitments under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture?

Brazil also questioned the United States over its US Financial Assurance to Revitalize Markets (FARM) program.

Brazil said that “in April 2026, the United States announced the FARM Initiative, expanding agricultural export financing through enhanced GSM-102 guarantees and cooperation with the Export-Import Bank (EXIM).”

The initiative apparently includes 100 percent payment guarantees in higher-risk markets and follows the introduction of an 18-month single-payment option in February 2026.

According to Brazil, the “expansion of government guarantees to 100% of payment obligations in higher-risk markets raises a question about the relationship between risk and pricing.”

Moreover, Brazil asked “if the additional coverage is intended precisely for transactions that commercial lenders would otherwise be reluctant to finance, what evidence demonstrates that the premiums charged adequately reflect the risks assumed by the US Government?”

In particular, Brazil sought to know: “how have the actuarial assumptions underlying GSM-102 been revised to account for the new coverage conditions, considering the findings in WTO dispute DS267(cotton dispute) and the self-financing requirements of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision?”

Separately, Brazil questioned Washington about the $8 billion Harvest Fuel Relief Program announced in October, which provides additional assistance to US agricultural producers to compensate for market disruptions and increased production costs.

Brazil said that “according to the USDA, this new programme follows USD 12 billion in assistance under the Farmer Bridge Assistance programme and approximately USD 14 billion in gross payments under the Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) programmes in 2026.”

Brazil maintained that it “is concerned about the cumulative effects of successive agricultural support programmes, particularly where payments are linked to specific commodities, planted acreage, production costs and market prices.”

Brazil’s Questions

Against this backdrop, Brazil asked the United States to answer the following questions:

·         Could the United States provide a breakdown, by commodity, of the total support provided or announced in 2026 under HFR, FBA, ARC and PLC, identifying the amounts actually disbursed and any overlapping beneficiaries?

·         How will HFR payments be classified under the Agreement on Agriculture? Does the United States consider them exempt from reduction commitments? If so, under which specific provisions of Annex 2 or Article 6?

·         Given that HFR payments are calculated using commodity-specific planted acreage, production costs and market prices, how does the United States demonstrate that the program does not encourage production or distort competition in international agricultural markets?

·         How does the United States distinguish genuinely exceptional assistance from recurring agricultural income support when successive programs compensate producers for similar market disruptions and production costs?

·         What is the estimated cumulative impact of these programs on US product-specific AMS and Current Total AMS? Can the United States demonstrate that the additional payments will remain within its WTO domestic support commitments?

Several other members, including India and China, also sharply questioned US farm subsidies, which appear to be excessively high and in violation of Washington’s Uruguay Round subsidy commitments, according to people familiar with the developments.